Balancing Safety and Security at Fukushima

When diverse systems are integrated, systems engineers must often trade off security against safety, and vice versa. As an illustration, consider automated building-access systems. Safety engineers generally prefer building-access systems to fail open so that anyone trapped in a burning building, for example, can escape and/or emergency workers (such as firemen and EMS workers) can easily enter the building. On the other hand, security professionals would likely suggest that building-access systems should fail closed so that bad guys, such as looters, cannot enter the building.

Safety requirements should prevail. I say this because of direct personal experience and also a story that I was told a dozen years ago, neither of which I can support through published references. While there have been a number of well-documented cases where business owners locked emergency exits of factories, night clubs, etc. with resulting high numbers of deaths when fire broke out, they are not based on automated systems but on human action, such as the locking of emergency exit doors.

Sadly, I now have a documented case of an automated system locking personnel into a dangerous environment. It relates to the catastrophe at the Japanese Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant both during and immediately after the 3-11 earthquake. In a news article by Terril Jones dated March 26, 2011 and with the title “Japanese worker inside stricken reactor recalls quake,” available at , you can read the following harrowing vignette:

“… the lights went out, leaving about 200 workers inside the reactor in near-darkness since the structure has no windows.

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