Disclaimer: The opinions of the columnists are their own and not necessarily those of their employer.
C. Warren Axelrod

Negative Testing Revisited – Vehicle Control Systems (Part 1)

Physical equipment can be engineered and tested to a high level of assurance that it will not fail in operation, even when subjected to harsh use over extended periods of time. Usually engineers will apply a big safety margin for critical systems in order to lower the likelihood of failure. They will also specify aggressive replacement schedules that account for normal and extreme wear and tear. However, there are times when designs are not adequate or equipment is not built to specifications, with resulting failure. Examples are the Toyota (non-hybrid) physical brake pedals, which require shims to be added in order to avoid sticking or, on a grander scale, the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, as I referenced in my column of June 24, 2008 with the title “Security Mindset: Nature or Nurture?”

As mentioned above, there is some indication that electromagnetic interference may be contributing to the software failures in the cars’ braking systems, which made me think of my December 28, 2009 column “EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) –Yet Another Critical Infrastructure Concern.” Perhaps we have been addressing the EMP issue from too high an altitude. Electromagnetic emissions may be a bigger problem than we had anticipated. It seems that you don’t need a hostile adversary to create such problematic situations … we are perfectly capable of doing it to ourselves.

So what should we do about these issues? I’ll discuss various approaches in Part 2.

So what are we to do as we do as technology migrates inexorably from mechanical systems (of which we have had centuries of experience), to electromechanical systems (for which our experience is less than a century), to software-controlled electronic systems (for which our experience is a mere few decades). Granted there are highly reliable, highly redundant computer-based systems, such as those used in NASA’s space program and those found in aircraft. But they are extremely costly to develop. It certainly appears, from recent experience, that comparable reliability and redundancy should be required of computer systems in personal vehicles. But at what cost? And are we willing to pay for it?

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